Dealing with China has been the most discussed topic of Indian foreign policy since 2020. There is no doubt that China has violated the basic principle of non-use of force in resolving disputes. Due to this, the old bilateral framework has completely broken down. The debate is on how to build a new relationship based on current realities. The new framework will be adapted to circumstances that are very different from 1990. At that time, the economies of India and China were comparable and their military capabilities were quite balanced. Now China's GDP is more than four times ours and at least on paper, the situation of the two armies is not the same. Nor is it likely that even according to optimistic growth estimates, India will be able to reduce this gap to a great extent in the next 10 years. Both India and China are facing some challenges. But due to geopolitical differences, both countries are not able to come together for their common solution. On top of this, China is rapidly increasing its global presence, due to which India's competition with it will increase, not friendship.
From the perspective of deterrence against Chinese aggression, India is doing a commendable job. Apart from increasing the number of troops and equipment, the concept of strategic risk is being redefined. By changing the deployment pattern, a clear signal is being given that PLA's war strategy in the grey zone will not be tolerated. China betrayed in Galwan, so now it has to provide clear and concrete evidence of good faith. Unless China makes a permanent change in its attitude on the LAC, it is not possible to restore India's trust in it.
But is standing up to China’s aggressive policies a sufficient policy response in itself? Note that at the height of the Cold War, the two superpowers never stopped political dialogue. Mechanisms were put in place to prevent nuclear war, manage competition, and limit the possibility of accidental conflict. An important lesson from the Cold War was that dialogue and confrontation go hand in hand.
Apart from brief meetings in Bali and Johannesburg, there has been no direct bilateral interaction between the Prime Minister of India and the President of China in the last four years. During Wang Yi's visit to India in March 2022, there was not a single bilateral meeting between foreign ministers, nor did the defence ministers or national security advisers of the two sides meet. Low-level meetings and meetings at multilateral conferences cannot lead to the kind of discussions that are needed to create a new framework for relations.
It is important to ask whether China has done anything concrete to address India's objections to its continued militarisation along the LAC after political talks stalled since 2020. It does not seem so. On the contrary, China has increased its military strength, including air power, along the entire front. China remains adamant on withdrawing its forward posts in two areas of eastern Ladakh. The status quo remains despite more than 20 rounds of talks between the two armies.
Military dialogue has its limitations. Without political dialogue, the military cannot develop a new framework for border management. Is it not possible that continuing dialogue at the political level ends this cycle? The importance of this policy lies in creating greater awareness among citizens about the reasons for the abnormalities in India-China relations. It also helped adjust economic and procurement policies to free sensitive sectors of the Indian economy from complete dependence on Chinese supply chains. But it is not possible to completely isolate the Indian economy. Synergies may increase, not decrease, in some areas such as electric vehicles.
Some of our large exporters, especially pharmaceuticals, are also dependent on Chinese supply chains. Despite strong policy and incentives, the import reduction target may not be possible even under the PLI scheme. Predictable relations with our neighbouring countries will help us focus on economy building. These efforts are more likely to be derailed if political dialogue stops.
Dialogue with China does not mean the end of the confrontational process. India always has the sovereign right to defend itself on its soil. Nor does dialogue mean compromising national security interests in any way. Deterrence and dialogue are two sides of the policy coin. Positive outcomes are possible if deterrence is combined with dialogue. The Sumdorong Chu crisis in Arunachal Pradesh in 1987 established that India had achieved its objectives after standing its ground for eight years without suspending political dialogue.
What objectives can be served by the resumption of political dialogue? First, it can help in understanding each other's positions in depth at the political level. Hopefully, such a dialogue can provide both sides some common ground to build a new framework. This can benefit risk management, not only in terms of reducing unintended conflict, but also in terms of modernising the 1993 and 1996 agreements to make them relevant to contemporary requirements.
From our perspective, it can provide a political platform to express our concerns. It can also become a platform to find solutions to China's unfair trade practices. Dialogue is also a logical step in diplomacy that goes on simultaneously at many levels. Only the government can ultimately decide what the right policy is. But a healthy debate on this question is needed now more than ever because public participation in foreign policy is a vital requirement for citizens who aspire to make India a global superpower.
The author is a former foreign secretary.
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